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The saying-is-believing (SIB) effect occurs when tailoring a message to suit an audience 
infl uences a communicator’s subsequent memories and impressions about the communication 
topic. Previous studies were restricted to one-person audiences and individuals as the 
communication topic. The present studies explored the SIB effect with multiple-person 
audiences and groups as the communication topic. In Study 1, the SIB effect occurred with 
a 1-person, but not a 3-person, audience. In Study 2, the SIB effect occurred with a 3-person 
audience when the audience explicitly validated communicators’ messages. These fi ndings 
demonstrate the generalizability of the SIB effect to group contexts, provide further evidence 
for a shared reality interpretation of this effect, and suggest a potentially important mechanism 
underlying stereotype development.
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The saying-is-believing (SIB) effect occurs when 
a message tailored to a particular audience 
influences a communicator’s subsequent 
memory and impression of the message topic. 
In a typical SIB study (Higgins & McCann, 
1984; Higgins & Rholes, 1978), a participant is 
given information about a target person (e.g. 
Donald) and instructed to describe Donald to 
another person (the audience) who ostensibly 
either likes or dislikes him. The audience’s task 
is to identify Donald from among a number of 
people whom the audience knows.
One important fi nding in SIB studies is that 
participants communicate messages that are 
consistent with their audience’s opinion. That 
is, participants communicating to an audience 
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who likes Donald convey a more positive im-
pression of him than do those communicating to 
an audience who dislikes Donald. Such audience 
tuning (Higgins, 1992; cf., Zajonc, 1960) is con-
sistent with substantial research showing that 
communicators take their audience’s perspective 
into account when designing messages (Clark & 
Marshall, 1981; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Fussell 
& Krauss, 1989; Grice, 1975; Rommetveit, 1976). 
More intriguing is the effect of audience tuning 
on communicators’ memories and impressions 
of Donald. Participants communicating to an 
audience who likes Donald typically have more 
favorable memories and impressions of him 
than do those communicating to an audience 
who dislikes Donald. Importantly, the effect of 
the audience’s opinion on communicators’ sub-
sequent memories and impressions depends on 
the content of their messages. These memories 
and impressions are distorted in the direction of 
the audience’s opinion only to the extent that 
communicators tuned their original message 
to that opinion.
The SIB effect, which has been replicated 
many times (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 
2005; Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, & Groll, 
2008; Higgins & McCann, 1984; Higgins & 
Rholes, 1978; McCann, Higgins, & Fondacaro, 
1991; Sedikides, 1990), provides a powerful 
demonstration of how communicating to a one-
person audience affects memories and impres-
sions of a target person. But does the SIB effect 
also operate in group contexts? That is, do com-
municators show the SIB effect after sending 
messages to audiences composed of several 
people rather than a single person? Moreover, 
do communicators show the SIB effect when 
the target of their communication is a group 
rather than an individual? These questions are 
investigated in the present studies.
Communicating to a group
The prevailing explanation of the SIB effect in 
studies using one-person audiences is based on 
the notion of shared reality (Echterhoff et al., 
2005).1 According to the shared reality perspec-
tive, obtaining social support for one’s subjective 
experiences provides validity for those experi-
ences (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992; 
Levine & Higgins, 2001). The shared reality 
perspective provides an explanation for the SIB 
effect by suggesting that communicators obtain 
social validation for their messages when those 
messages are shared with an audience. This vali-
dation causes communicators to view their mes-
sages as unbiased information about the target, 
even though the messages were in fact biased 
through audience tuning. Therefore, when com-
municators recall the original target information 
or report their impressions of the target, they 
rely on their messages more than on the original 
information. This results in the audience’s opinion 
having an indirect effect on communicators’ 
memories and impressions, an effect that is me-
diated by the content of their messages. That is, 
the audience’s opinion affects communicators’ 
messages, which in turn shape their memories 
and impressions about the target.
Given that all previous research on the SIB 
effect has utilized a single-person audience, it is 
not known whether the same audience tuning 
and cognitive distortions would occur if com-
municators sent messages to larger audiences. 
One hypothesis, based on the shared reality per-
spective, is that the SIB effect will be as strong, or 
even stronger, in this case. As explained earlier, 
the crucial feature of the shared reality account 
of the SIB effect is that the audience validates 
the communicator’s message. Recent evidence 
indicates that when a one-person audience fails 
to provide such validation, the SIB effect does 
not occur (Echterhoff et al., 2005). If participants 
communicating with a multiple-person audience 
perceive that their message is validated, then 
the SIB effect should occur in that situation as 
well. In fact, it may be even stronger than in the 
one-person audience case, because validation 
from several people is likely to provide more 
subjective support than is validation from a 
single person. This may occur because a view 
advocated by several people is less likely to be 
attributed to a personal idiosyncrasy or bias than 
is a view advocated by a single person, which in 
turn should lend it greater weight (cf. Goethals 
& Darley, 1977). Evidence that people believe 
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there is a high degree of social consensus for 
their opinions (Krueger, 1998; Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977) also suggests that the subjective 
support provided by others’ agreement depends, 
at least in part, on how many others are involved 
(cf. Gerard & Orive, 1987). Finally, the notion 
that shared reality is developed and maintained 
in group contexts is consistent with a broad 
range of work on such diverse phenomena as 
social identity and self-categorization (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group 
decision making (Davis, 1973; Stasser & Titus, 
1985), group beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1990), social repre-
sentations (Moscovici, 1984), transactive memory 
(Moreland, 1999), and shared mental models 
(Mohammed & Dumville, 2001; for reviews, see 
Levine & Higgins, 2001; Tindale, Meisenhelder, 
Dykema-Engblade, & Hogg, 2001).
An alternative hypothesis is that increased 
audience size will cause communicators to 
adopt the audience’s opinion directly, thereby 
eliminating the SIB effect. This could occur if 
communicators perceive the opinion of mul-
tiple audience members as highly credible 
and therefore accept the audience’s opinion as 
valid. In cases of such ‘informational infl uence’ 
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; see also Wood, 1999), 
communicators’ messages and their memories 
and impressions of the target would be shaped 
by the audience’s opinion. Importantly, however, 
the impact of the audience’s opinion on 
memories and impressions would be direct, 
rather than mediated by communicators’ 
messages. In this case, there is no need for 
communicators to rely on their messages when 
thinking about the target, because they can 
rely directly on the audience’s opinion for 
their information. The fi rst goal of the cur-
rent research is to test these two competing 
hypotheses by assessing whether the SIB effect 
occurs when audience size is increased from 
one person to three people.
Communicating about a group
The second goal of the present research is to 
determine if the SIB effect extends to situ-
ations in which the message topic is a group 
rather than an individual. As noted earlier, 
communicators in previous SIB studies always 
received and transmitted information about a 
single individual. If the SIB effect can also be 
shown to occur when communicators receive 
and transmit information about a group, then 
the SIB paradigm may become an important 
tool for studying how group perceptions in 
general and group stereotypes in particular 
develop through communication.
Evidence indicating that the SIB effect occurs 
in group perception would extend a growing 
body of research on the communication of 
stereotypes (Kashima, 2000; Lyons & Kashima, 
2003; Maass, 1999; Ruscher, 2001; Wigboldus, 
Semin, & Spears, 2000). It is clear from this re-
search that interpersonal communication is an 
important means by which stereotypes develop 
and persist. For example, overhearing another 
person make racist remarks can enhance a 
listener’s tendency to express racist opinions 
(Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 
1994; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Simon & 
Greenberg, 1996). In addition, discussing a 
group, particularly with members of a salient 
ingroup, increases stereotyping (Brauer, Judd, & 
Jacquelin, 2001; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & 
Turner, 1999; Haslam et al., 1998; Ruscher, 1998; 
Sani & Thompson, 2001; Thompson, Judd, & 
Park, 2000, Study 2). Finally, stereotype consensus 
is linked to communication in that easily commu-
nicated traits are more likely to persist in stereo-
types (Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002).
Most studies on the communication of stereo-
types have focused on how existing stereotypes 
are discussed by communicators. By contrast, 
relatively little attention has been given to how 
someone with no stereotype of a group comes to 
adopt the stereotype held by a communicative 
partner. Research on how stereotypes develop 
through communication using the SIB para-
digm is thus timely. This is particularly true be-
cause the desire to create or maintain shared 
reality, which we view as the critical determinant 
of the SIB effect, has been shown to play an im-
portant role in stereotype development and 
maintenance (Lyons & Kashima, 2003; Ruscher, 
Hammer, & Hammer, 1996; Sechrist & Stangor, 
2001; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001; see also 
Hardin & Higgins, 1996).
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Study 1
Overview
The goals of Study 1 were to determine whether 
the SIB effect would occur when: (i) the audience 
consisted of several people rather than a single 
person; and (ii) the communication topic was a 
group rather than an individual. In this study, 
communicators received information about 
an unfamiliar target group and then described 
that group to either a 1-person or 3-person 
audience that allegedly either liked or disliked 
the group. After a brief delay, communicators 
recalled as much as they could about the target 
group information in a free recall format. They 
also rated their overall impression of the group 
on a rating scale and described their impressions 
of the group in their own words.
Method
Participants Eighty-seven participants (41 
females and 46 males) were recruited from the 
introductory psychology subject pool of a large 
urban university. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the four conditions of a 2 (audience 
opinion: positive vs. negative) × 2 (audience 
size: 1 person vs. 3 people) between-subjects 
experimental design. Participants were run 
individually and received partial course credit for 
their participation. Each session took approxi-
mately 45 minutes.
Materials Information about the target group 
was patterned closely after that used to describe 
target individuals in previous SIB studies 
(Echterhoff et al., 2005b; Higgins & Rholes, 
1978; McCann & Hancock, 1983; Sedikides, 
1990), but modifi ed so that the characteristics 
described a group rather than an individual. 
Four characteristics used in recent studies 
(Echterhoff et al., 2005a, 2005b) were adapted 
for use in the current study (see Appendix). Char-
acteristics were designed to be neither clearly 
negative nor positive. The ambiguous nature of 
these characteristics was validated in previous 
research (Sedikides, 1990).
Procedure
Introduction and informed consent Participants 
were initially informed that the study involved 
communication and group perception. They 
were told that they would read information about 
a group and then send a message about that 
group via a computer network to an audience 
in another room. Next, participants read and 
signed an informed consent form.
Cover story The cover story and procedure 
were adapted from previous SIB studies to meet 
the needs of the current study. Participants 
were told that, as part of a separate study, re-
searchers had videotaped several small groups 
of friends interacting in various settings. The 
audience for the current study ostensibly had 
been watching videotapes of four of these 
groups before the participant arrived. The par-
ticipant’s task was to read information com-
piled by the research team about one of the 
four groups and then send a description of that 
group to the audience over a computer network. 
The audience’s task was to identify the group 
the participant described from among the four 
groups they had watched.
Audience size manipulation Several times while 
describing the task, the experimenter referred 
to the audience as consisting of either one per-
son or three people. This information was also 
repeated in written instructions presented to 
participants prior to beginning the task.
Audience opinion manipulation Prior to presenting 
the target group information to participants, 
the experimenter introduced the audience 
opinion manipulation by mentioning that the 
audience either liked or disliked the target 
group, referred to as Group B. In the 1-person 
audience condition, the experimenter said the 
following:
By the way, since the other participant has watched 
the videotape of Group B, they have developed their 
own impression of the group: The ratings that per-
son provided indicate that they [seem to like—don’t 
seem to like] Group B and believe the group [has—
doesn’t have] many good qualities.
In the 3-person audience condition, the mani-
pulation was presented as follows:
By the way, since the other participants have watched 
the videotape of Group B, they have each developed 
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their own impression of the group: The ratings 
that each of them provided indicate that they all 
three [seem to like—don’t seem to like] Group B 
and believe the group [has—doesn’t have] many 
good qualities.
Communication task and follow-up measures The 
communication task was presented via a com-
puter program. Instructions tailored to the 
participants’ audience size condition were pre-
sented on the fi rst screen of the program. The 
target description was presented on the second 
screen. After reading the target description, par-
ticipants proceeded to the next screen, which 
prompted them to type and send a message 
describing the information they had just read 
about the target group.
Next, participants spent approximately 10 
minutes completing a crossword puzzle, which 
was used to allow the decay of short-term memory 
for information about the target group. Par-
ticipants then used the computer to answer 
questions about the target group. They were 
told that their responses for the remainder of 
the experiment would be kept private (i.e. would 
not be shared with their audience). Participants 
were asked to recall the original description of 
the target group and report their impressions of 
it. For the recall task, participants were instructed 
to reconstruct the description as best they could, 
trying to use the exact words and sequence of 
information. The impressions measure consisted 
of two components. First, participants were asked 
to rate their general liking for the group on a 
rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very 
much). Second, participants were asked to type 
a few sentences that describe their personal im-
pressions of the group members. The order of 
completing the recall and impression measures 
was counterbalanced across participants.
To assess the success of the manipulations, 
participants were asked to recall how many 
people were in their audience and whether the 
audience liked or disliked the target group.2 
Participants were then debriefed and dismissed 
from the experiment.
Results
Manipulation checks Of the 87 participants, 
85 (98%) correctly identifi ed the size of their 
audience, and 73 (84%) correctly identifi ed their 
audience’s opinion of the target group. Thus, 
both manipulations were successful.
Coding Two independent coders blind to 
condition coded the message, recall, and im-
pression passages written by participants. The 
coders broke down each passage into segments 
that roughly mapped on to the original target 
information. Each segment was then coded as 
containing negative or positive distortion of 
small, moderate, or extreme magnitude. The 
distortion ratings for each segment were com-
bined into an overall score for the passage 
ranging from –5 (extreme negative distortion) to +5 
(extreme positive distortion). Intercoder reliability 
was acceptable for messages (r(87) = .92), recall 
(r(87) = .73), and impressions (r(87) = .93), so 
the ratings from the two coders were averaged. 
The average message and recall codes served as 
dependent measures in the analyses. For im-
pressions, the standardized average code and 
the standardized rating of participants’ overall 
impression of the group were highly correlated 
(r(87) = .71). They were therefore averaged, and 
this combined score served as the measure of 
impressions in the analyses.
Audience tuning The extent to which partici-
pants tailored their messages to their audience’s 
opinion was assessed by conducting a 2 (audience 
opinion) × 2 (audience size) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with message 
valence as the dependent variable.3 This analy-
sis revealed a main effect of audience opinion, 
such that messages written for positive audi-
ences (M = .81, SD = 1.23) were more positive 
than messages written for negative audiences 
(M = –.53, SD = 1.55), F(1, 83) = 19.78, p < .001, 
η2 = .19. Neither the main effect of audience 
size nor the interaction was signifi cant, F values 
< 1.11, p values > .29. These results indicate that 
audience tuning occurred and was similar in 
magnitude for 1- and 3-person audiences.
Recall and impressions A 2 (audience 
opinion) × 2 (audience size) between-subjects 
ANOVA with recall valence as the dependent 
variable was conducted to assess whether the 
extent of recall bias varied by audience opinion 
and size. There was a signifi cant main effect 
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of audience opinion on recall, such that par-
ticipants who communicated to a positive 
audience had more positive recall of the target 
group (M = .68, SD = .76) than did those who com-
municated to a negative audience (M = .16, 
SD = .66), F(1, 82) = 11.94, p < .01, η2 = .13. There 
was also a main effect of audience size, such that 
participants who communicated to a 1-person 
audience had more positive recall (M = .58, 
SD = .87) than did those who communicated 
to a 3-person audience (M = .24, SD = .58), F(1, 
82) = 5.01, p < .05, η2 = .06. The interaction 
between audience opinion and size was not 
signifi cant, F < 1, indicating that the extent of 
recall bias in the direction of the audience’s 
opinion was similar across 1- and 3-person 
audiences.
The same analysis was repeated with impres-
sions as the dependent variable. There was a 
signifi cant main effect of audience opinion on 
impressions, such that participants who com-
municated to a positive audience had more pos-
itive impressions of the target group (M = .40, 
SD = .85) than did those who communicated to 
a negative audience (M = –.44, SD = .78), F(1, 
83) = 22.83, p < .001, η2 = .22. Neither the main 
effect of audience size nor the interaction was 
signifi cant, F values < 1.31, p values > .25. As with 
the results for recall, the extent to which im-
pressions were biased in the direction of the 
audience’s opinion was similar across 1- and 
3-person audiences.
The earlier analyses on valence of recall and 
impressions do not shed light on whether the 
SIB effect occurred in the 1- and 3-person audi-
ence conditions. Rather, it is necessary to con-
duct path analyses to identify whether message 
valence mediated the relationship between audi-
ence opinion and communicators’ subsequent 
cognitions (i.e. recall and impressions) about 
the group within each audience size condition. 
Path analyses for 1- and 3-person audiences were 
therefore examined separately, as is typically 
done in studies examining moderators of the 
SIB effect (Higgins & McCann, 1984; McCann 
& Hancock, 1983; Todorov, 2002).
1-person audience Whether the SIB effect 
occurred in the 1-person audience condition, as 
it did in prior studies using an individual, rather 
than a group as the target, was examined fi rst. The 
SIB effect exists when the relationships between 
the audience’s opinion and communicators’ sub-
sequent cognitions about the target (i.e. recall 
and impressions) are mediated by the valence of 
communicators’ messages to the audience.
Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998) outlined four 
steps to test mediation. These are: (i) demon-
strating a signifi cant relationship between the 
independent variable (audience’s opinion) and 
the dependent variable (recall or impression), 
(ii) demonstrating that the independent vari-
able signifi cantly predicts the mediator (message 
valance), (iii) demonstrating that the mediator 
signifi cantly predicts the dependent variable 
when controlling for the independent variable, 
and (4) demonstrating that the relationship 
between the independent and dependent 
variables is eliminated when controlling for 
the mediator. They noted, however, that step 4 
is only necessary when full mediation is pre-
dicted. If partial mediation is present, the 
relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables could be reduced, but 
still remain signifi cant. Partial mediation is 
suffi cient to demonstrate the SIB effect, which 
predicts only that controlling for message 
valence substantially reduces the relationship 
between audience opinion and communicators’ 
subsequent cognitions. In addition, Kenny et al. 
(1998) argued that step 1 is not required for 
mediation to be present. Consistent with recent 
developments in methods for testing mediation 
(see Collins, Graham, & Flaherty, 1998; Shrout 
& Bolger, 2002), Kenny et al. (1998) asserted 
that, ‘Step 1 is not required, but a path from 
the initial variable to the outcome is implied 
if Steps 2 and 3 are met. So the essential steps 
in establishing mediation are Steps 2 and 3’ 
(p. 260). Therefore, in the current research, 
all four steps are conducted, but emphasis is 
placed on steps 2 and 3, in line with Kenny et al.’s 
recommendations.
In the 1-person audience condition, the direct 
effect of audience opinion on recall (step 1) 
was marginally signifi cant, β = .29, t(41) = 1.92, 
p = .06, and the effect of audience opinion 
on message (step 2) was signifi cant, β = .34, 
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t(41) = 2.30, p <.05 (see Figure 1). Further-
more, in a regression analysis in which both 
message and audience opinion were included 
as predictors of recall, message was signifi cant 
(step 3), β = .43, t(40) = 2.94, p < .01, whereas 
audience opinion was not (step 4), β = .14, 
t(40) = .98, ns. A Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) ex-
amining whether controlling for message 
signifi cantly reduced the relationship between 
audience opinion and recall was marginally 
signifi cant, Z = 1.81, p < .07. These results pro-
vide some evidence that the SIB effect occurred 
for recall with a 1-person audience using a 
group as the message topic, thus replicating 
the previous literature while extending it to a 
group as the target of communication instead 
of an individual.
Stronger evidence was obtained for the SIB 
effect for impressions (see Figure 1). The effect 
of audience opinion on impressions was signi-
fi cant, β = .40, t(41) = 2.82, p < .01, as was the 
effect of audience opinion on message (noted 
Figure 1. Standardized beta coeffi cients for path analyses in 1- and 3-person audience conditions. Direct 
effects of audience opinion on recall and impressions, not controlling for the effect of message, are given 
in parentheses. Effects of message on recall and impressions are controlling for audience opinion. Paths for 
recall and impressions were estimated in separate analyses.
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earlier). In a regression analysis in which both 
message and audience opinion were included as 
predictors of impressions, message signifi cantly 
predicted impressions, β = .53, t(40) = 4.12, 
p < .001, but audience opinion did not, β = .22, 
t(40) = 1.74, ns. A Sobel test revealed that con-
trolling for message signifi cantly reduced the 
relationship between audience opinion and im-
pressions, Z = 2.33, p < .05. The SIB effect was 
therefore obtained in the 1-person condition for 
impressions as well as recall, again replicating 
the previous literature while extending it to a 
group as the target of communication instead 
of an individual.
3-person audience Mediational analyses were 
also performed in the 3-person audience 
condition (see Figure 1). The effect of audience 
opinion on recall (step 1) was significant, 
β = .48, t(41) = 3.46, p < .01, as was the effect of 
audience opinion on message (step 2), β = .55, 
t(42) = 4.25, p < .001. However, when both mes-
sage and audience opinion were included as 
predictors of recall, message was not a signifi cant 
predictor of recall (step 3), β = .19, t(40) = 1.16, 
ns, while audience opinion remained a strong 
predictor (step 4), β = .38, t(40) = 2.32, p < .05. 
Given that message did not predict recall when 
audience opinion was controlled, the conditions 
of mediation set forth by Kenny et al. (1998) 
were not met. Therefore, the SIB effect was not 
obtained for recall in the 3-person audience con-
dition. Instead, the audience’s opinion directly 
affected communicators’ subsequent mem-
ories without mediation by message valence.
The results for impressions mirrored the 
recall results (see Figure 1). Specifi cally, even 
though audience opinion predicted impres-
sions, β = .53, t(42) = 3.99, p < .001, and mes-
sage (noted earlier), message did not predict 
impressions while controlling for audience 
opinion, β = .22, t(41) = 1.44, ns. Furthermore, 
the effect of audience opinion on impressions 
remained strong, even after controlling for 
message, β = .40, t(41) = 2.59, p < .05. Thus, once 
again, the audience’s opinion directly affected 
communicators’ subsequent impressions with-
out mediation by message valence.
Discussion
One goal of Study 1 was to determine whether 
the SIB effect would occur when the topic of 
communication was a group rather than an 
individual. Such an effect was indeed obtained 
in the 1-person audience condition, demon-
strating that communicators’ tendency to tune 
their message to their audience’s attitude can 
infl uence their memories and impressions of 
unfamiliar groups with ambiguous (i.e. neither 
strongly positive nor negative) characteristics. 
This fi nding suggests a new and potentially 
important mechanism by which people develop 
stereotypes of groups. Some implications of 
this discovery are discussed later.
Another goal of Study 1 was to determine 
whether the SIB effect would occur when the 
audience consisted of several people rather 
than a single individual. In contrast to the 1-
person audience condition, we did not obtain 
the SIB effect in the 3-person audience con-
dition. In the 3-person audience condition, 
communicators’ messages did not mediate the 
relationship between the audience’s attitude, 
on the one hand, and communicators’ recall 
and impressions, on the other hand. Instead, 
there was a direct effect of audience attitude on 
communicators’ recall and impressions. These 
findings are consistent with the possibility, 
discussed earlier, that communicators might 
perceive the opinion of multiple audience 
members as highly credible (i.e. high in epistemic 
authority) and therefore accept the audience’s 
opinion as valid, thereby reducing their reliance 
on their audience-tuned messages as a source of 
information about the communication target. 
These fi ndings represent another potential 
contribution to the literature on the SIB effect, 
in that they raise the possibility that this effect 
is sensitive to audience size given that unani-
mous groups are likely to have greater epistemic 
authority than a single individual.
These results are intriguing and raise the ques-
tion of whether there are any conditions under 
which the SIB effect might occur with multiple-
member audiences. Recent research testing 
implications of the shared reality interpret-
ation of the SIB effect with 1-person audiences 
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suggests a factor that may infl uence the strength 
of this effect with multiple-person audiences as 
well. Echterhoff et al. (2005) found that com-
municators’ belief about the success of their mes-
sage in creating shared reality with their audi-
ence was an important determinant of the SIB 
effect. Specifi cally, Echterhoff et al. manipulated 
message success by providing communicators 
with feedback indicating that the audience 
either did or did not correctly identify the per-
son described in communicators’ messages. In 
this study, the SIB effect was eliminated in the 
failure feedback condition.
The default assumption with a 1-person 
audience (unless explicitly disconfi rmed) is that 
the communicator’s message was in fact under-
stood by the audience (i.e. a success) and hence 
the communicator and audience achieved 
shared reality about the topic (Echterhoff et al., 
2005). This might not be true for many 3-
person audiences, however. Indeed in Study 1, 
30% of participants (13 of 44) in the 3-person 
audience condition indicated that they did not 
believe all members of the audience correctly 
identifi ed the target group. This contrasts with 
only 7% of participants (3 of 43) in the 1-person 
audience condition who did not believe the 
audience correctly identifi ed the target group, 
χ2(1, N = 87) = 7.38, p < .01. It is possible, then, 
that uncertainty about successful establishment 
of shared reality with the audience contributed 
to the absence of the SIB effect in the 3-person 
audience condition of Study 1.
To examine this possibility, we explored whether 
the SIB effect was stronger for participants who 
believed that the entire audience correctly iden-
tifi ed the target group than for participants who 
did not hold this belief. Specifi cally, we con-
ducted two regression analyses testing whether 
the interaction between message valence and 
belief in audience correctness predicted recall 
and impressions. Each regression model also 
contained the main effects of audience opinion, 
audience size, belief in audience correctness, and 
message valence. The interaction between belief 
in audience correctness and message valence 
significantly predicted recall (t(80) = 2.26, 
p < .05), indicating that the effect of message 
valence on recall was indeed greater for those 
who believed the entire audience correctly iden-
tifi ed the target group than for those who did not 
hold this belief. A similar pattern was observed for 
impressions, although the interaction term did 
not reach signifi cance, t(81) = 1.40, p = .16.
Consistent with prior work (Echterhoff et al., 
2005), this analysis suggests that communi-
cators must believe that audience members cor-
rectly identifi ed the target group on the basis 
of their message in order for the SIB effect to 
occur. The purpose of Study 2 was to test the 
hypothesis that the SIB effect will occur with a 
3-person audience as long as communicators 
are assured that all members of the audience cor-
rectly identifi ed the target group. If uncertainty 
about the establishment of a shared reality with 
the audience was the key reason why the SIB 
effect did not occur in the 3-person audience con-
dition of Study 1, then the SIB effect should 
emerge in the 3-person audience condition of 
Study 2, where all communicators were told 
their message was understood by all members 
of the audience.
Study 2
Method
Participants Ninety-four participants (72 
females and 22 males) were recruited from the 
introductory psychology subject pool of a large 
urban university. Participants were run indi-
vidually and received partial course credit for 
participating. Each session took approximately 
45 minutes.
Procedure The procedure for Study 2 was 
identical to that used in Study 1 except for the 
following modifi cations. First, all audiences were 
portrayed as consisting of three people. Second, 
participants were informed that the audience 
correctly identifi ed the group that participants 
described in their message. This information 
was provided after the fi ller task, before partici-
pants’ memories and impressions of the target 
group were assessed. Third, the manipulation 
check for audience opinion asked participants 
to rate the extent to which the audience liked or 
disliked the target group on a scale of 1 (disliked 
very much) to 7 (liked very much).4
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Results
Manipulation check Positive audiences 
(M = 5.68, SD = 1.05) received higher liking 
ratings for the target group than did negative 
audiences (M = 2.55, SD = 1.04), t(92) = 14.56, 
p < .001, η2 = .70. The audience opinion mani-
pulation was thus successful.
Coding Measures of message, recall, and im-
pression valence were created using the pro-
cedure from Study 1. Intercoder reliability 
was acceptable for each measure: messages, 
r(94) = .88; recall, r(94) = .74; and impres-
sions, r(94) = .93.5
Audience tuning Degree of audience tuning 
across conditions was assessed by conducting 
an independent samples t test comparing mes-
sage valence for positive and negative audience 
opinion conditions. As in Study 1, messages 
written for positive audiences (M = .84, SD = 1.44) 
were more positive than messages written for 
negative audiences (M = –.49, SD = 1.45), 
t(92) = 4.46, p < .001, η2 = .18. Audience tuning 
therefore occurred in Study 2.
Testing for the SIB effect Preliminary analyses 
were conducted on recall and impression scores 
to determine whether they varied by audience 
opinion condition. Results indicated that par-
ticipants who communicated to a positive audi-
ence had more positive recall of the target group 
(M = .37, SD = .75) than did those who com-
municated to a negative audience (M = .03, 
SD = .79), t(92) = 2.15, p < .05, η2 = .05. In ad-
dition, participants who communicated to a 
positive audience had more positive impres-
sions (M = .50, SD = .75) than did those who com-
municated to a negative audience (M = –.50, 
SD = .86), t(92) = 5.99, p < .001, η2 = .28.
As in Study 1, path analyses were conducted on 
recall and impression scores to test for the pre-
sence of the SIB effect. Whether the SIB effect oc-
curred for recall was assessed fi rst (see Figure 
2). The effect of audience opinion on recall 
(step 1) was signifi cant, β = .22, t(92) = 2.15, 
p < .05, as was the effect of audience opinion on 
message (step 2), β = .42, t(92) = 4.46, p  < .001. 
Furthermore, the effect of message on recall 
when controlling for audience opinion was 
signifi cant (step 3), β = .38, t(91) = 3.59, p < .01. 
Finally, when controlling for message, the effect 
of audience opinion on recall was no longer 
signifi cant, β = .06, t(91) = .55, ns. According to 
the Sobel test, the effect of audience opinion on 
recall was signifi cantly reduced when control-
ling for message, Z = 2.80, p < .01. Thus, with 
the addition of the success feedback, the SIB 
Figure 2. Standardized beta coeffi cients for path analyses in study 2. Direct effects of audience opinion on 
recall and impressions, not controlling for the effect of message, are given in parentheses. Effects of message 
on recall and impressions are controlling for audience opinion. Paths for recall and impressions were 
estimated in separate analyses.
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effect was present for recall with a 3-person 
audience. This fi nding replicates the previous 
literature while extending the SIB effect to a 
group rather than an individual as the audience 
of the communication.
Parallel analyses were conducted for impres-
sions (see Figure 2). First, there was a signifi cant 
effect of audience opinion on impressions, 
β = .53, t(92) = 5.99, p < .001, and on message, 
as noted earlier. Furthermore, when both mes-
sages and audience opinion were included as 
predictors of impressions, each was signifi cant: 
for messages, β = .50, t(91) = 5.96, p < .001; for 
audience opinion, β = .32, t(91) = 3.85, p < .001. 
Because the effect of audience opinion on im-
pressions remained signifi cant when control-
ling for message, the criteria for full mediation 
were not met. However, a Sobel test revealed 
that the relationship between audience opinion 
and impressions was signifi cantly reduced when 
controlling for message, indicating that mes-
sage partially mediated the relationship, Z = 3.56, 
p < .001. Thus, as in the case of recall, the SIB 
effect was also present for impressions with the 
3-person audience. This fi nding, once again, re-
plicates the previous literature while extending 
the SIB effect to a group rather than an indi-
vidual as the audience of the communication.
Discussion
The goal of Study 2 was to test the hypothesis 
that uncertainty regarding the establishment of 
shared reality with the audience may have con-
tributed to the absence of the SIB effect in the 
3-person audience condition of Study 1. If so, 
then explicitly informing communicators that 
all members of a 3-person audience understood 
their message should result in the re-emergence 
of the SIB effect. Consistent with this reasoning, 
when communicators received explicit feedback 
that all members of the audience understood 
their message in Study 2, the SIB effect was ob-
tained for both recall and impressions. These 
fi ndings demonstrate that a strong SIB effect can 
occur when communicators transmit messages 
to audiences of more than one person, as long 
as they receive explicit confi rmation that the 
audience understood their message. Thus, 
when communicating to audiences of more than 
one person, communicators do rely on their 
audience-tuned messages in thinking about the 
target if they believe that their messages were 
understood by the entire audience. These results 
are consistent with a shared reality interpret-
ation of the SIB effect (Echterhoff et al., 2005; 
Higgins, 1999). In addition, Study 2 replicated 
Study 1 by demonstrating that the SIB effect 
can occur when the target of communication 
is a group rather than an individual.
General discussion
The SIB effect occurs when tuning a message to 
suit an audience infl uences a communicator’s 
subsequent memories and impressions about 
the communication topic (Higgins & Rholes, 
1978). The present research was designed to 
explore whether the SIB effect would occur 
under two previously unexplored conditions: 
when the audience consisted of more than one 
person and when the topic of communication 
was a group.
In Study 1, consistent with prior studies, we 
obtained the SIB effect when communicators 
sent messages to an audience of one person. By 
contrast, this effect did not occur when com-
municators sent messages to an audience of three 
people. In the latter condition, the audience’s 
opinion had a direct effect on communicators’ 
memories and impressions of the communication 
target, indicating that communicators relied 
on the information provided by the audience’s 
opinion rather than on the informational value 
of their own audience-tuned message. Almost 
one-third of the communicators in the 3-person 
audience condition expressed doubt that all 
members of the audience understood their 
message, which may have contributed to their 
failure to rely on their audience-tuned messages 
when later thinking about the target group.
In Study 2, we examined whether providing 
communicators with explicit feedback that all 
members of a 3-person audience understood 
their messages would lead them to rely on these 
messages when thinking about the target group, 
thereby producing the SIB effect. In contrast 
to Study 1, we obtained the SIB effect for both 
recall and impressions, providing yet more 
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support for a shared reality interpretation of 
the SIB effect.
The current research adapted basic features 
of the standard SIB paradigm to investigate the 
role of shared reality in producing the SIB effect 
when both the audience and communication 
target were groups rather than individuals. 
Although this paradigm has much to recommend 
it, there are potential benefi ts to studying the SIB 
effect using other methodologies. For example, 
as is typical in SIB research, communicators in 
the current studies were presented with a brief 
summary of the target’s characteristics and then 
were asked to engage in one-way communication 
about those characteristics with an audience 
about whom they knew very little. It would be 
interesting to explore whether the SIB effect 
also occurs in richer communication environ-
ments, such as those in which communicators 
learn about a target fi rst hand and then engage 
in two-way communication with audience 
members. In addition to exploring the SIB effect 
in richer communication environments, it might 
be profi table to examine additional audience 
characteristics that infl uence the strength of the 
SIB effect. For example, the SIB effect may be 
reduced or even eliminated if the audience’s 
opinion about the target group is perceived as 
insincere (e.g. due to the audience’s motivation 
to present itself as more favorable toward the 
target than it really is), and this reduction or 
elimination of the SIB effect may occur regard-
less of the size of the audience.
Our fi nding that the SIB effect can occur when 
the topic of communication is a group rather 
than an individual suggests a potentially power-
ful mechanism by which communication within 
a group can create or consolidate stereotypes 
about outgroups. Specifi cally, group members’ 
knowledge that others within the group hold 
a stereotype about an outgroup may cause 
them to tune their communications about that 
group to their audience’s position, which (at 
least under certain conditions) will produce 
the SIB effect. This, in turn, may cause the 
communicators either to adopt the stereotype 
(if they do not initially hold it) or to feel more 
confi dent about it (if they do hold it). Over 
time, this process of mutual tuning and saying-
is-believing may well produce group polarization 
regarding the stereotype (cf. Brauer et al., 2001; 
Ruscher, 1998).
An issue for future research is whether inform-
ation about the target group should include 
characteristics of the group as a whole, as in the 
current studies, or characteristics of individual 
group members. Previous research has shown 
that people develop different kinds of stereo-
types if they learn about individual members as 
opposed to the group as a whole. Specifi cally, 
learning about individual members, as opposed 
to the overall group, causes the group to be per-
ceived as more variable (i.e. heterogeneous; Park 
& Hastie, 1987) and less stereotypic (Thompson 
et al., 2000). It would therefore be interesting 
to explore whether the SIB effect occurs when 
communicators have access to individual-level, 
as opposed to group-level, information. Research 
examining how people process information 
about individuals versus groups suggests that 
people can draw inferences about a group 
based on knowledge about individual group 
members, but this is more likely for groups that 
are higher in entitativity (Hamilton & Sherman, 
1996; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998). 
Varying the entitativity of the target group as well 
as the type of information communicators have 
about the group (individual or group level) might 
thus yield useful information regarding the 
SIB effect.
Finally, regardless of whether the topic of com-
munication involves an individual or a group, 
questions remain about the specifi c elements 
of social validation that are necessary to elicit 
the SIB effect. In previous work (Echterhoff 
et al., 2005) and in the current research, social 
validation was manipulated by informing com-
municators that their audience correctly 
identifi ed the topic of communication based on 
communicators’ messages, implying that the 
audience understood the information com-
municators were attempting to transmit. Learn-
ing that the information in one’s message was 
successfully transmitted to the audience (i.e. 
was understood by the audience) is no doubt an 
important type of social validation. However, a 
different, and perhaps even more important, 
type of social validation might occur when an 
551
Hausmann et al. communication and group perception
audience explicitly accepts the content of the 
message as true. In existing studies of the SIB 
effect, communicators probably assume that the 
audience accepts, as well as understands, their 
message because the message was designed to 
match the audience’s opinion. Thus, our own 
and other research probably confounds under-
standing and acceptance of the message as sources 
of social validation. Understanding the content 
of a communicator’s message, however, does not 
require an audience to accept the message as 
true. Similarly, accepting a communicator’s mes-
sage as true does not require an audience to fully 
understand the message. Disentangling the 
effects of having one’s message understood versus 
accepted by an audience is therefore important 
for understanding the conditions under which 
shared reality develops.
Notes
1. For a discussion of other possible explanations 
for the SIB effect (e.g. cognitive dissonance, 
biased encoding of target information), see 
Echterhoff et al. (2005a).
2. Additional exploratory measures were collected 
but are not discussed because they are not 
germane to this article (see Hausmann, 2005).
3. All analyses were also conducted using gender 
of participants and the order in which they 
completed the recall and impression tasks 
as covariates. Including these covariates did not 
change the results of Study 1 or 2. Gender and 
task order are therefore not discussed further.
4. Audience member independence/
interdependence was also explored in Study 
2. Half the audiences were described as 
independent (i.e. working alone during the 
experiment), as had been done in Study 1. The 
other half were described as interdependent 
(i.e. watching the videotape of the target 
group together, discussing the tape, and 
making a joint decision). Analyses revealed 
that this manipulation did not affect the 
outcome variables, and the overall pattern of 
results was the same for the independent and 
interdependent audience conditions. Data were 
therefore collapsed across these conditions, and 
this variable is not discussed further.
5. As in Study 1, the standardized average code 
for impressions and the standardized rating of 
participants’ overall impression of the group 
were highly correlated (r(94) = .80) and were 
therefore averaged.
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Appendix 
Descriptions used in target essay:
1. Once the members of this group make up their 
minds to do something it is as good as done no 
matter how long it might take or how diffi cult 
the going might be. Only rarely do they change 
their minds even when it might be better if 
they did.
2. The members of this group recently started 
making attempts to keep up to date with cultural 
knowledge. They read books about Europe, sat 
in a music appreciation workshop, and ate in 
fashion-able ethnic restaurants. In social situations, 
they often talk at length about foreign cultures 
and art.
3. In order to improve their lives, these group members 
try to save money. They use coupons, buy things 
on sale, and avoid donating money to charity or 
lending money to friends.
4. A lot of people enjoy this group’s humor. The 
group members are in the habit of making jokes 
out of the blue. Often times in parties their humor 
is quick to address the faults that people have or 
the mistakes that people have made.
